Active and Forced Choice for Overcoming Status Quo Bias: A Field Experiment on the Adoption of “No junk mail” Stickers in Berlin,Germany

Consumers around the world are burdened by large amounts of unaddressed junk mail. Attaching “No junk mail” stickers to mailboxes offers a simple solution for protecting against unwanted ads. Presumably, the use of such stickers can be increased if consumers deliberately decide either for or against receiving junk mail. This conjecture of status quo bias was tested in a field experiment run with more than 900 households in Berlin, Germany. In one treatment, stickers were put into mailboxes, facilitating active choice. In a second treatment, stickers were attached halfway onto the outsides of mailboxes, forcing consumers to either remove or fully attach them. It was found that roughly a fifth of the sample attached a sticker after treatment. With uptake of more than 21, as compared to 16%, the forced choice was more effective than the active choice treatment. The findings highlight the importance of green nudges and defaults for promoting pro-environmental behaviour. Implications for landlords of the presented interventions are discussed. The field of social norms is identified as a promising area for extending the scope of the present study.     

Capital budgeting, information timing, and the value of abandonment options

This paper investigates how an abandonment option influences the optimal timing of information in a sequential adverse selection capital budgeting model. While the divisional manager has imperfect private pre-contract information, headquarters can time whether the manager obtains perfect project information before (timely information) or after (delayed information) the contract is signed. In the absence of the abandonment option, headquarters favors timely (delayed) information if the investment costs are high (low). The presence of the abandonment option favors delayed information because under the timely information regime the value of the abandonment option is zero, whereas under the delayed information regime the value of the option is positive.     

Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model

We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.     

Einnahmen- und ausgabenseitige Multiplikatoren der deutschen Volkswirtschaft

Theoretically based on the Haavelmo theorem, this study analyses the economic effects that increasing public expenditure or reducing public income have on the gross domestic product of Germany, with the help of two medium-sized macro-econometric models, the RWI business cycle model and the Econometric Model of the German Economy. The major finding is that most of the public revenue multipliers are considerably lower than most of the public spending multipliers. However, both the dimension and the time course of the effects are a function of the specific kind of politico-economic measures taken by the government.     

Wettbewerb und Regulierung des Bahnmarktes

Die Wettbewerbssituation auf dem deutschen Bahnmarkt ist vielschichtig: Sowohl die verschiedenen Teilsegmente des Bahnmarktes als auch der intermodale Wettbewerb müssen berücksichtigt werden. Dabei besteht die Gefahr, die Wettbewerbsposition des gesamten Eisenbahnverkehrs gegenüber anderen Verkehrstr?gern aus den Augen zu verlieren.     

Corporate Strategies for Managing Climate Risks

This paper focuses on organizations and their management of climate risks. Climate risks stem from continued changes in climate means and the increase in frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. We ask whether companies also apply the usual process of corporate risk management to climate risks. In seeking to answer this question, we review several literature streams in order to set out an initial theoretical reflection. Based on this we conducted an exploratory case study with 11 electric utilities. Our results illustrate that these companies perceive climatic changes as a material issue for their business. However, management has restricted knowledge about such climatic changes and thus cannot precisely determine the potential negative impacts on business activities. As a consequence, the companies have implemented a climate risk management that does not differ from the usual process of managing other business risks. Our results further illustrate that there is some variation in how individual firms manage climate risks: While risk identification and risk assessment are equally important for all electric utilities, there are differences in how management determines the direction of the individual response to climate risks. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

The mortality among industrial insured lives in Norway during the war

In the Norwegian life insurance company Fram a continuous mortality investigation takes place in connection with the yearly valuation of policies issued with weekly premiums. The investigation gives the aggregate mortality, the unit is the policy and the year of observation is the calendar year. A detailed account of the method used has been given by Fredrik Borch in his paper: “The mortality among industrial insured lives in Norway 1931–1940” in this journal 1943. The most important results of the investigation from the years 1940–1946 are rendered below.     

DOES THE ECB HAVE A TIME‐INCONSISTENCY PROBLEM? A NOTE

A standard time‐inconsistency model of monetary policy, extended to include a time‐varying natural rate of unemployment, implies cointegration between the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. An application of the model to data for the EMU countries does not yield strong evidence of cointegration. In addition, the sign of the estimated coefficient of cointegration is not in line with a sign restriction imposed by the time‐inconsistency model.